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INSURER'S PRECONTRACTUAL DUTIES 
D Millard 
B Kuschke 
1 Introduction 
Historically, the nature and extent of the pre-contractual duty of disclosure by the 
prospective policyholder has been a pre-occupation in insurance law. The current 
age of consumerism has, however, seen a paradigm shift to the flipside of the coin: 
the transparency duties of the insurer towards the consumer. In an increasingly 
rules-driven environment, values such as transparency, equality and fairness are 
becoming more obscured because of complicated and extremely detailed legislation. 
In a frantic attempt to "tick all the boxes", financial services providers face the real 
danger of losing sight of the values that should inform their conduct. The purpose of 
this contribution is to establish to what extent South African contract law and 
insurance legislation partner to strengthen transparency in pre-contractual 
negotiations for insurance. The current interest in transparency is fuelled by 
legislation such as the Promotion of Access to Information Act,1 which enhances and 
builds upon the constitutionally entrenched right of access to information included in 
section 32 of the Constitution.2  
Transparency has many faces. It has been described as an omnipresent term, and is 
usually understood to promote the rule of law, economic efficiency, anti-corruption 
initiatives, democratic participation and human rights.3 Transparency and 
accountability are mutually reinforcing principles as the one informs the other. Even 
before the term "transparency" became popular, transparent conduct has always 
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1  Promotion of Access to Information Act 2 of 2000. 
2  Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
3  Ala'i and Vaughn International Handbook on Transparency 2. 
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been accepted as an underlying principle of contract law,4 and a lack of transparency 
resulted in consequences for the relationship between the parties involved and 
consequences focussing on claims for compensation.5  
Transparency entails removing the barriers to and facilitating free and easy access to 
laws, rules, processes and information.6 It embraces a lack of hidden agendas and 
conditions, accompanied by the publication of all of the information required to 
enable collaboration, cooperation and decision making. True transparency in the 
commercial sense requires a minimum degree of disclosure in terms of which 
agreements, dealings, practices, and transactions are open to all for verification.7 In 
the context of insurance, transparency in a narrow sense means that precontractual 
information must be provided in a clear, comprehensible and unambiguous manner. 
Transparency is essential for a free and open exchange through which all of the 
parties can effectively assess their rights and duties in a way that is fair and clear. 
This is especially the case when insurance cover is procured, as it will influence the 
policyholder's purchase decision. Cost transparency pertaining to the limits of the 
cover offered and the premiums to be paid in life insurance, for example, is of the 
utmost importance. 
This turns the debate to consumer issues. According to the Financial Services Board: 
The asymmetry of information between retail financial services consumers and 
financial institutions means that financial services consumers are particularly 
vulnerable to unfair treatment. Typically, financial institutions have far more 
expertise and resources available to them in designing, distributing and servicing 
financial products than consumers have available to them in making decisions about 
financial transactions. The nature of financial products and services is such that, in 
many instances, the consequences of unfair treatment or poor decisions are only 
felt some time – in some cases many years – after transacting. Significant hardship 
                                        
4  See for example the discussion on misrepresentation and the duty of disclosure in South African 
contract law in para 2.1 below; also the Report by the Project Group Restatement of European 
Insurance Contract Law Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (hereafter "PEICL") 48, 
58 on a detailed discussion of the European perspective. 
5  Some of which are examined below. 
6  Stoop and Chürr 2013 PER/PELJ 517, 519-520. 
7  See for example the description of the transparency duties of the insurer in sched 2 s 24 of the 
Australian Competition and Consumer Act 2010; Business Dictionary date unknown 
http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/transparency. 
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can result. In South Africa, these challenges are exacerbated by low levels of both 
basic and financial literacy, increasing the risk of consumer exploitation.8 
Insurance contracts are consumer agreements par excellence.9 Although 
transparency issues such as non-disclosure and misrepresentation are prevalent 
throughout the life cycle of insurance contracts, this contribution focuses only on the 
pre-contractual duties of insurers, intermediaries and advisors towards prospective 
policyholders.  
It is accepted that a "product life cycle" refers to a number of distinct stages in the 
life span of a financial product.10 These stages are the product and service design, 
promotion and marketing, advice, point of sale, information after point of sale, and 
the handling of complaints and claims.11 Only those rules pertaining to 
precontractual dealings and, more specifically, promotion and marketing and the 
conduct of intermediaries before the conclusion of the contract will be investigated. 
Transparency after the "point of sale" is a subject for another discussion. 
The insurer's precontractual duty of disclosure is a primary consumer protection 
mechanism.12 In most countries the rules pertaining to precontractual negotiations 
and the advertising of insurance products are regulated by statute.13 In South Africa, 
the regulations are contained primarily in the Financial Advisory and Intermediary 
Services Act (hereafter the "FAIS Act").14 However, as this statute does not replace 
                                        
8  FSB 2011 https://www.fsb.co.za/feedback/Documents/Treating%20Customers%20Fairly%20-
%20The%20Roadmap%202011.pdf (hereafter "TCF") 6. 
9  See, however, the recent exclusion of insurance products and services from the scope of the 
Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008, as discussed in para 2.2 below. 
10  TCF 8. 
11  TCF 8. 
12  Internationally consumer rights include the right to the disclosure of information and the right to 
fair and responsible marketing to encourage responsible and informed consumer choices and 
behaviour. See in general s 3(1)(e) of the Consumer Protection Act 68 0f 2008; s 3(e)(ii) of the 
National Credit Act 34 of 2005 for national recognition of this basic consumer right. 
13  See for example the third generation European Union Directives on insurance: European Union 
Directive 92/94/EEZ (Third Non-life Insurance Directive) and European Union Directive 
92/96/EEZ (Third Life Insurance Directive) that apply to all EU Member States. An interesting 
distinction made in the EU is that so-called "large risks" and reinsurance fall beyond the scope of 
the statutory precontractual information duty. Large risks are described in PEICL 1:103(2)(a), (b) 
and (c). Such a distinction is foreign to our law. Information duties, whether pre-contractual or 
during the existence of the contract, apply to most policies. Differentiation applies to the content 
of disclosures, depending on the type of cover and the nature of the risks insured. 
14  37 of 2002, specifically s 16(2)(a) and (c). 
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the common law in toto,15 common law aspects as well as additional provisions 
contained in the Long-term Insurance Act (hereafter "LTIA")16 and the Short-term 
Insurance Act (hereafter "STIA")17 will also be deliberated. 
2 Promotion and marketing of insurance products and luring potential 
customers 
2.1 General 
Whether a particular statement constitutes an advertisement, merely amounts to 
"puffing" or is in fact an offer that upon acceptance creates consensus and a binding 
contract will depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. 
The duty to inform a contracting party about the information relevant to the 
prospective contract, and to warn him or her about prejudicial aspects is recognised 
by the general principles of contract law such as the right to fair dealing and the 
prevention of improper conduct when concluding a contract. A failure to do so would 
amount to the so-called culpa in contrahendo.18 As no exclusive lex specialis is 
created by insurance legislation, the common law pertaining to misrepresentations is 
not limited in its application, but its scope is rather more clearly defined by the 
statutory intervention as discussed below.  
A simple commendatio non obligat is a mere general commendation that does not 
amount to misrepresentation, provided that it "does not condescend to 
particulars".19 Although difficult to define, it has been held by our courts that once it 
is an exaggeration "intermingled with facts and punctuated by details",20 it is seen as 
a precontractual misrepresentation by a representor, who then suffers its normal 
                                        
15  Hattingh and Millard FAIS Act Explained 83. 
16  52 of 1998. 
17  53 of 1998 
18  This is a term that is specifically used in international literature such as PEICL s II 96. See in 
general s 2, 3 and 6 of the General Code of Conduct  for Authorised Financial Services Providers 
and Representatives (hereafter the "GCC") issued in terms of s 15 of the FAIS Act by Financial 
Services Board Notice 80 of 2003 in GG 25299 of 8 August 2003 in this regard. 
19  Small v Smith 1954 3 SA 434 (SWA) 436. Also see in general Christie and Bradfield Christie's Law 
of Contract 284; Hutchison and Pretorius Law of Contract 119. 
20  Milne v Harrilal 1961 1 SA 799 (N) 807. Also see Geldenhuys and Neethling v Beuthin 1918 AD 
426. 
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consequences. This entails the innocent party's right to claim rescission of the 
contract and restitutio in integrum, and a potential delictual claim for damages. 
Misrepresentations are not always contained in express statements, but can be 
made by either commissions or omissions.21 In insurance the problem is often 
caused by what the insurer chooses not to disclose, rather than what he does. An ex 
lege duty to speak does not apply in all circumstances. Such a duty will, however, be 
recognised where there is: 
an involuntary reliance of the one party on the frank disclosure of certain facts 
necessarily lying within the exclusive knowledge of the other such that, in fair 
dealing, the former's right to have such information communicated to him would be 
mutually recognised by honest men in the circumstances.22 
This will clearly be the case in insurance matters, as the prospective policyholder 
cannot usually ascertain or identify omitted information merely by conducting his 
own due diligence examination.23 Due to his position as the weaker party at the 
bargaining table, he is subjected to an involuntary reliance on information provided 
to him by the more informed insurer. An ex lege duty to speak by parties in 
insurance contracts was recognised in Iscor Pension Fund v Marine and Trade 
Insurance Co Ltd24 as follows: 
In some contracts parties are required to place their cards on the table to a greater 
extent than in others, but the determination of the extent of the disclosure does not 
depend on the label we choose to stick on a contract. The principles applicable to 
contracts of insurance do not differ in essence from those applicable to other kinds 
of contracts, but where one party has means of knowledge not accessible to the 
other party, and where from the nature of the contract the latter (as in the case of 
insurance) binds himself on the basis that all material facts have been 
communicated to him, the non-disclosure of such a fact is fatal.25 
                                        
21  An omissio per commissionem. See Qilingele v SA Mutual Life Assurance Society 1993 1 SA 69 
(A); Clifford v Commercial Union Insurance Co of SA Ltd 1998 4 SA 150 (SCA) 156. In insurance, 
the distinction between a positive misrepresentation and a "negative non-disclosure" is not 
always clear. See Reinecke, Van Niekerk and Nienaber South African Insurance Law 151. 
22  In the words of Millner 1957 SALJ 189. Also see ABSA Bank Ltd v Fouche 2003 1 SA 176 (SCA) 
for a recent decision on the general duty to disclose information. 
23  See in this regard McCann v Goodall Group Operations (Pty) Ltd 1995 2 SA 718 (C) 723 where 
the courts highlighted that no duty to speak can exist where a party can ascertain information by 
common observation or ordinary diligence. 
24  Iscor Pension Fund v Marine and Trade Insurance Co Ltd 1961 1 SA 178 (T). 
25  Iscor Pension Fund v Marine and Trade Insurance Co Ltd 1961 1 SA 178 (T) 185. 
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This was subsequently confirmed by the appeal court in Mutual & Federal Insurance 
Co Ltd v Oudtshoorn Municipality.26 
There are several general requirements in common law for an actionable 
misrepresentation, whether by commissionem or by omissionem, for all contracts 
including insurance contracts. These include the making of a false or misleading 
statement by the insurer or someone for whose acts he is responsible such as his 
agents and appointed brokers if the representation is material. The interpretation of 
what will be seen as material and what is seen as merely trivial is not always clear. 
Materiality appears to depend on a two-pronged test, namely whether the 
representation was made with the intention to induce the other party to contract, 
and then whether a reasonable person would have been so induced.27 It is 
submitted that this must go to the root of the matter as interpreted from the 
viewpoint of the "reasonable policyholder".28 Furthermore, the statement should 
induce the prospective policyholder into concluding the insurance contract, yet does 
not have to be the decisive or dominant cause.29 Finally, the insurer must have had 
the intention to induce, not necessarily the intention to mislead or defraud.30 This is 
usually the case as advertisements are drafted with exactly this goal in mind, and 
not necessarily with ill intent. 
The presence of fault is thus not a requirement for the innocent party to resile from 
the agreement,31 yet a subsequent claim for damages will depend on whether the 
representation was made fraudulently or negligently.32 The policyholder may resile 
                                        
26  Mutual & Federal Insurance Co v Oudsthoorn Municipality 1985 1 SA 419 (A) 433. 
27  See also Mutual & Federal Insurance Co v Oudsthoorn Municipality 1985 1 SA 419 (A) 433. The 
facts and the circumstances of each case will determine whether facts were material or not, 
rather than the nature of the contract or the type of transaction. 
28  This appears to be the international standard in most other countries in Europe. It is known in 
Germany, for example, as the "Durchscnittsversicherungsnnehmer" or average applicant for 
insurance cover. Deutsches BGHZ 4.4 2001, 112, 115. 
29  Whether it in fact caused the inducement is a subjective question in our law, irrespective of 
whether a reasonable person would have been so induced or not. See Schultz v Meyerson 1933 
WLD 199. 
30  Novick v Comair Holdings Ltd 1979 2 SA 116 (W). 
31  As confirmed in the recent decision in Brink v Humphries & Jewell (Pty) Ltd 2005 2 SA 419 (SCA) 
421. 
32  In the case of a delictual claim for damages, the normal requirements will apply, of which fault is 
one. See Bayer South Africa (Pty) Ltd v Frost 1991 4 SA 559 (A). 
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from the contract either entirely or partially,33 provided that the misrepresentation 
was material and made with the intention to induce, yet he may claim delictual 
damages only where fault is present.34 
It can be argued that false or misleading advertising is equally bad, regardless of 
whether it pertains to shoes, coffee beans or insurance. However, that ignores the 
fact that insurance products are credence goods, while shoes and coffee beans are 
not.35 Credence goods and services are those goods of which the quality can be 
established only at some cost after sale. The value of these goods is typically spread 
over, or emerges only after a considerable period of time has lapsed. The purchaser 
who wishes to reverse a transaction for credence goods usually incurs a considerable 
loss due to benefits foregone, the failure to select an alternative product, or actual 
costs and expenses incurred. It is simple enough to establish whether shoes or 
beans are fit for use but whether an insurance product is suitable to a particular 
consumer is not so evident. Therefore it can be said that it is even more important 
when advertising insurance to provide the correct information and not to mislead the 
public. To be transparent in this context means to refrain from luring unsuspecting 
and uninformed members of the public into transactions under false pretences or by 
abusing one's superior position, and to ensure that those who do react to 
advertisements do not do so because of one's deceitfulness.This is discussed in more 
detail below.  
  
                                        
33  Where the contract is in fact divisible. 
34  This is possible where the misrepresentation is intentional or even where it was negligent. See 
Bayer South Africa (Pty) Ltd v Frost 1991 4 SA 559 (A). 
35  FSB 2010 http://www.insurancegateway.co.za/download/1427 (hereafter "TCF Discussion 
paper"). The FSB explains: "In the case of search goods, quality and price can be ascertained at 
low cost prior to purchase or where a credible warranty is attached. Selection of a shirt, for 
example, typically involves an evaluation of the fit, style and price prior to purchase. By contrast, 
experience-goods are those whose quality can be ascertained at low cost through use, though 
not prior to purchase. So for example, evaluation of a vacuum cleaner is typically made after 
purchase. Moreover, a faulty vacuum cleaner can be returned and a replacement obtained at 
relatively low cost to the consumer. While the element of uncertainty at the point of purchase is 
clearly higher than in the case of search goods, the degree of uncertainty is bounded. Many 
services tend to fall into the experience category, as it is only after the laundry has been done, 
or the haircut performed, that the consumer may evaluate the quality." 
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2.2 General consumer protection legislation 
Some consider that the identification of transparency as a core value of the 
worldwide drive for maximum consumer protection is derived from the universal 
right of access to information.36 Although insurance products and services have at 
last been excluded from the application of the general South African Consumer 
Protection Act (herafter "CPA"),37 insurance legislation as a special type of insurance 
consumer law is aimed primarily at protecting the policyholder or insured.  
The introduction of the CPA in 2011 initially created difficulties for the insurance 
industry. The definition of "service" excluded advice provided in terms of the FAIS 
Act, the LTIA and the STIA.38 Services rendered in terms of the FAIS Act were 
definitely excluded from the CPA. However, the exclusion of services rendered 
pertaining to insurance as meant by the LTIA and the STIA was subject to an 
exclusion contained in schedule 2, section 10 of the CPA, which stipulated that the 
insurance industry had a period of 18 months from the commencement of the CPA 
to align all consumer protection measures with those of the CPA.39 The period of 
grace lapsed without an effective allignment with the consumer protection measures 
and criteria found in the CPA in insurance legislation.  
On 28 February 2014, however, the Financial Services Laws General Amendment 
Act40 came into operation. Section 66, that replaces section 28 of the Financial 
Services Board Act,41 confirms that the CPA does not apply to: 
(i) any function, act, transaction, goods or services that is or are subject to 
Financial Services Board legislation; or subject to (ii) the board or a registrar 
referred to in Financial Services Board Legislation.42 
When it comes to the advertising and marketing of insurance products it is 
submitted that these matters now resort under the ambit of precontractual 
                                        
36  See s 32 of the Constitution.  
37  Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008 (hereafter the "CPA"). 
38  Section 1(c)(i) of the CPA. 
39  Millard Modern Insurance Law 6. 
40  Financial Services Laws General Amendment Act 45 of 2013, as promulgated in GN 584 in GG 
37351 of 18 February 2014. 
41  Financial Services Board Act 97 of 1990. 
42  Section 66(2) of the Financial Services Laws General Amendment Act 45 of 2013. 
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negotiations and will therefore fall squarely within the realm of the industry-specific 
FAIS Act. One should also bear in mind that the LTIA and the STIA also contain 
consumer protection measures in more product-specific rules, as discussed below. 
Transparency issues not expressly regulated by these statutes will still be governed 
by substantive common law provisions, as discussed under paragraph 2.1 above. 
2.3 Special transparency duties to be observed in advertising insurance 
products 
2.3.1 FAIS Act 
Advertisements for insurance products should not be misleading.43 In this regard, 
insurers are not in a different position from any other provider who offers products 
or services. Generally speaking, advertising in South Africa is largely self-regulated.44 
The Advertising Standards Authority as the regulator operates by bringing together 
the three parts of the industry, namely the advertisers who pay for the advertising, 
the advertising agencies responsible for its form and content, and the media which 
carry it, which together co-operate to set the standards for advertising. More 
importantly, though, Part X of the GCC in terms of the FAIS Act provides strict rules 
for advertising. According to section 1(1) of the GCC, "advertisement" means: 
[A]ny written, printed, electronic or oral communication (including a communication 
by means of a public radio service), which is directed to the general public, or any 
section thereof, or to any client on request, by any such person, which is intended 
merely to call attention to the marketing or promotion of financial services offered 
by such person, and which does not purport to provide detailed information 
regarding any such financial services; and 'advertising' or 'advertises' has a 
corresponding meaning. 
In addition, section 14 of the GCC states that an advertisement by a provider must 
not contain any statement, promise or forecast which is fraudulent, untrue or 
misleading.45 Where an advertisement contains performance data (including awards 
and rankings), it must also include references to the source and date of the data.46  
                                        
43  Section 16(1)(c) of the FAIS Act. 
44  Advertising Standards Authority of South Africa (hereafter "ASA") Advertising Code of Practice 
http://www.asasa.org.za/codes/advertising-code-of-practice. 
45  Section 14(1)(a) of the FAIS Act. 
46  Section 14(1)(b)(i) of the FAIS Act. 
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Where an advertisement contains illustrations, forecasts or hypothetical data, these 
must be supported by clearly stated basic assumptions coupled with a "reasonable 
prospect of being met under current circumstances".47 The insurer must also 
emphasise that these illustrations and forecasts are not guaranteed.48 Where returns 
or benefits are dependant on the performance of underlying assets or other variable 
market factors such as investments, the advertisement must state that this is the 
case.49 To complicate matters, advertisements with forecasts must also prominently 
display a warning statement about the risks involved in buying or selling a financial 
product50 and contain an additional warning that past performances are not 
necessarily indicative of future performances.51 If the investment value of a financial 
product mentioned in the advertisement is not guaranteed, the advertisement must 
contain a warning that no guarantees are provided.52 
Advertisements by telephone are also regulated. Although the GCC does not make 
this distinction, it is submitted that there is a primary distinction between 
advertisements to existing clients and advertisements to members of the public who 
are not customers. The latter is a form of "cold calling" and is illegal in terms of the 
Protection of Personal Information Act.53 The former presupposes that the existing 
client consented to receiving advertisements by phone, and where an insurer then 
advertises a financial service by telephone, such an insurer must keep an electronic, 
voice-logged record of all communications.54 Where the advertisement did not lead 
to the rendering of a financial service, the insurer needs to keep the record for 45 
days only.55 However, if the promotion does result in the rendering of a financial 
                                        
47  Section 14(1)(b)(ii)(aa) of the FAIS Act. 
48  Section 14(1)(b)(ii)(bb) of the FAIS Act. 
49  Section 14(1)(b)(ii)(cc) of the FAIS Act. 
50  Section 14(1)(b)(iii) of the FAIS Act. 
51  Section 14(1)(b)(iv) of the FAIS Act. 
52  Section 14(1)(c) of the FAIS Act. 
53  Sections 5(f), 11(3)(b), 69 of the Protection of Personal Information Act 4 of 2013. Also see 
Registrar of Financial Services Providers v Catsicadellis and Botha (now Greyvenstein) 
(Enforcement Committee) unreported case number 6 of 6 November 2012. 
54  Section 14(2)(a) of the FAIS Act. 
55  Section 14(2)(a) of the FAIS Act. 
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service, the insurer is obliged to provide full details to the client in writing and within 
30 days as per sections 4(1)(a) and 4(1)(c) and 5(a) and (c) of the GCC.56  
The purpose of these regulations is to ensure that a client who is approached with 
advertising material and who is in all likelihood preoccupied or not in a position to 
record all the information presented to him is not prejudiced. This would especially 
be the case where advertising by phone is instrumental in the conclusion of an 
insurance contract.  
Furthermore, although the relevant regulations are all aimed at transparency, crafty 
telemarketers are still at an advantage when they deal with clients in this fashion, as 
they work in high pressure environments and are motivated by set targets for sales. 
Their own personal objectives may very well lead them to market even more 
agressively.57 Members of the public should be educated regarding their rights, and 
telemarketers should be forced to follow up their telephonic advertisements in 
writing, by mail or email at the request of the person thus targeted. 
2.3.2 Role of insurance intermediaries 
The activities of insurance intermediaries have always previously been subject to 
common law (Roman-Dutch law), which was the most important source of the rules 
pertaining to insurance intermediaries.58 In terms of common law, the relationship 
between insurers, their representatives or employees, brokers and clients is often a 
matter of agency.59 This can entail the agent (the broker, representative or 
employee of the insurer) performing a juristic act on behalf of another (the 
principal).60 The agent can execute this mandate of the client,61 represent the client 
in entering into a legal relationship,62 and negotiate between different principals.63 
                                        
56  Section 14(2)(c) of the FAIS Act. 
57  Registrar of Financial Services Providers v Catsicadellis and Botha (now Greyvenstein) 
(Enforcement Committee) unreported case number 6 of 6 November 2012. 
58  Cohen 1997 SA Merc LJ 9, 30. 
59  Hattingh and Millard FAIS Act Explained 74; Reinecke et al General Principles of Insurance Law 
337; Havenga Law of Insurance Intermediaries 1. 
60  Reinecke et al General Principles of Insurance Law 337; Havenga Law of Insurance 
Intermediaries 2; Nienaber and Reinecke Life Insurance 201. 
61  Reinecke et al General Principles of Insurance Law 337, Havenga Law of Insurance 
Intermediaries 2; Nienaber and Reinecke Life Insurance 201. 
62  Nienaber and Reinecke Life Insurance 201-202. 
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However, when the agent is in fact a mandatory, he can complete an application 
form on the instructions and on behalf of a client,64 collect and receive information 
for an insurer on a prospective insured,65 or provide information.66 It is also his or 
her duty to act with care and skill,67 to act with good faith68 and to account for his 
actions.69 
The FAIS Act regulates the activities of insurance intermediaries, and has not 
changed the nature of the relationship between intermediaries and clients. Rather, 
the Act has introduced minimum standards according to which intermediary services 
should be rendered. This is because of the complexities associated with financial 
products and an asymmetry of information.70  
The Act applies to all types of financial products, including insurance, and section 
1(6) provides that the FAIS Act must be construed as being in addition to any other 
law not inconsistent with its provisions, and not as replacing any such law. The law 
of agency and mandate therefore applies, and the FAIS Act refines those general 
principles for the insurance industry. Insurance products are included in the 
definition of a "financial product".71 Although the Act does not contain a definition of 
                                                                                                                          
63  Nienaber and Reinecke Life Insurance 202. 
64  Nienaber and Reinecke Life Insurance 201. 
65  Nienaber and Reinecke Life Insurance 201. 
66  Nienaber and Reinecke Life Insurance 201. 
67  Havenga Law of Insurance Intermediaries 4; Hattingh and Millard FAIS Act Explained 75. 
68  Havenga Law of Insurance Intermediaries 4; Hattingh and Millard FAIS Act Explained 75. In 
general, also see Zimmermann "Good Faith and Equity" 217 et seq. 
69  Havenga Law of Insurance Intermediaries 4; Hattingh and Millard FAIS Act Explained 75. In 
general, also see Zimmermann "Good Faith and Equity" 217 et seq. 
70  Moolman et al Financial Advisory and Intermediary Services Guide 5. 
71  "Financial product" means, "subject to subsec (2)- (a) securities and instruments, including 
shares in a company other than a 'shareblock company' as defined in the Share Blocks Control 
Act, 1980 (Act No. 59 of 1980); debentures and securitised debt; any money-market instrument; 
any warrant, certificate, and other instrument acknowledging, conferring or creating rights to 
subscribe to, acquire, dispose of, or convert securities and instruments referred to in 
subparagraphs (i), (ii) and (iii); any 'securities' as defined in sec 1 of the Securities Services Act, 
2002; a participatory interest in one or more collective investment schemes; a long-term or a 
short-term insurance contract or policy, referred to in the Long-term Insurance Act, 1998 (Act 
No. 52 of 1998), and the Short-term Insurance Act, 1998 (Act No. 53 of 1998) respectively; a 
benefit provided by- (i) a pension fund organisation as defined in sec 1(1) of the Pension Funds 
Act, 1956 (Act No. 24 of 1956), to the members of the organisation by virtue of membership; or 
(ii) a friendly society referred to in the Friendly Societies Act, 1956 (Act No. 25 of 1956), to the 
members of the society by virtue of membership; a foreign currency denominated investment 
instrument, including a foreign currency deposit; a deposit as defined in sec 1(1) of the Banks 
Act. 1990 (Act No. 91 of 1990); a health service benefit provided by a medical scheme as 
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"intermediary", "intermediary service" denotes any act other than the furnishing of 
advice that is performed by a person for or on behalf of a client or product supplier 
that results in the client entering into or offering to enter into any transaction in 
respect of a financial product with a product supplier.72 Even if the client may enter 
into any such transaction in future, it means that an intermediary service had been 
rendered.73 The Act distinguishes intermediary services from "advice", making it 
clear that "advice" is any recommendation, guidance or proposal of a financial 
nature furnished by any means or medium, to any client or group of clients.74 The 
advice must pertain to the purchase of any financial product or the investment in 
any financial product75 and includes any recommendation, guidance or proposal of a 
financial nature: 
... on the conclusion of any other transaction, including a loan or cession, aimed at 
the incurring of any liability or the acquisition of any right or benefit in respect of 
any financial product.76 
The emphasis in the Act is therefore on intermediary services and advice. One must 
recognise that intermediary services and advice are often provided by insurance 
intermediaries as a single comprehensive service. The distinction in the Act seems to 
say that it is irrelevant whether an intermediary furnished advice together with 
assistance to enter into a contract of insurance or whether the intermediary only 
furnished advice or only assisted a client to enter into a contract. The FAIS Act 
applies in both instances and the insurance intermediary should have complied with 
all the provisions of the Act. 
                                                                                                                          
defined in sec 1(1) of the Medical Schemes Act, 1998 (Act No. 13 1 of 1998); any other product 
similar in nature to any financial product referred to in paragraphs (a) to (g), inclusive declared 
by the registrar after consultation with the Advisory Committee, by notice in the Gazette to be a 
financial product for the purposes of this Act; any combined product containing one or more of 
the financial products referred to in paragraphs (a) to (i) inclusive; any financial product issued 
by any foreign product supplier and marketed in the Republic and which in nature and character 
is essentially similar or corresponding to a financial product referred to in paragraphs (a) to (i), 
inclusive". 
72  Section 1 (1)(a) of the FAIS Act; Hattingh and Millard FAIS Act Explained ch 2, 5 et seq. 
73  Section 1 (1)(a) of the FAIS Act. 
74  Section 1(1)(a) of the FAIS Act, sv "advice". 
75  Section 1(1)(a) & (b) of the FAIS Act. 
76  Section 1(i)(c) of the FAIS Act. 
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In addition to the definitions of "intermediary services" and "advice" in paragraph 
1(b) above, the Act also introduces a representative as: 
... any person who renders a financial service to a client for or on behalf of a 
financial services provider, in terms of conditions of employment or any other 
mandatory agreement ...77 
An employee is anyone who stands in a formal contract of employment with a 
financial services provider, renders his services under the authority of the service 
provider and earns a salary and will include an employee who renders services via a 
call centre.78 A mandatory on the other hand serves as a representative under the 
supervision of a provider but will typically have his own offices with his own staff.79 
The FAIS Act allows for these mandatories to carry on business as sole proprietors 
or in any other available business form.80 In short, it is impossible to sell insurance 
and not comply with the FAIS Act.81 
2.3.3 LTIA and STIA 
As indicated in paragraph 2.3.1 above, all advertising of insurance products is 
subject to the provisions of section 14 of the GCC.  
As far as the Policyholder Protection Rules (PPR) (Long-term Insurance) are 
concerned, Part III Rule 4.1 contains the basic rules of conduct for direct marketing. 
These prescribe a general standard of conduct to render services honestly, fairly and 
with due skill, care and diligence. A direct marketer must also act honourably, 
professionally and with due regard to the convenience of the policyholder. 
                                        
77  Section 1(1) of the FAIS Act, sv "representative". 
78  Section 1(1) of the FAIS Act, sv "representative". On the contract of employment in general, see 
Van Jaarsveld "Labour Law" 499-533; Van Niekerk Law@work 61 et seq. 
79  Van Zyl Financial Advisory and Intermediary Services Manual 1-49. 
80  Van Zyl Financial Advisory and Intermediary Services Manual 1-49. On forms of business 
enterprise in general, see Benade et al Entrepreneurial Law 4. The FAIS Act is not prescriptive 
about the form of business enterprise chosen by a service provider. See in general Van Zyl 
Financial Advisory and Intermediary Services Manual 1-42. 
81  Intermediaries need to comply with the FAIS Act and specifically with the duties set out in the 
GCC as discussed in 2(a)(i) above. It is sometimes confusing as policies differ and each product 
demands different disclosures depending on the complexity and nature of the product. The only 
differentiation between different kinds of intermediaries pertains to the qualifications they must 
have, the level 2 examinations applicable to them, and the requirements pertaining to their 
continuous professional development (Moolman et al Financial Advisory and Intermediary 
Services Guide 42-44). 
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Rule 4.1(c) specifically prescribes the content of representations made to the 
policyholder. Rule 4.3 contains an extensive list of particulars that must be disclosed 
to the policyholder. Rule 4.1(d) requires a direct marketer to disclose any conflict of 
interest, and Rule 4.1(e) requires the marketer to render services in accordance with 
the contractual relationships and reasonable requests or instructions of the 
policyholder. These must be executed as soon as reasonably possible and with due 
regard to the reasonable interests of the policyholder, which must be accorded 
appropriate priority over any interests of the direct marketer. These provisions are 
the same as the corresponding prescriptions and provisions of the FAIS Act. The PPR 
(Short-term Insurance) contains a similar provision. 
3 The role of bona fides in pre-contractual negotiations 
3.1 Good faith under general contract law 
All contracts in our law are in principle bonae fidei.82 Where contracts are concluded 
between parties who are not on an equal footing, the universal role of good faith in 
common law is limited in that it merely underlies the duty imposed on the parties to 
act in good faith towards one another during the negotiations preceding their 
eventual agreement (by not making any misrepresentations by commission or 
omission), yet not upon the actual conclusion of their agreement.83 For the purposes 
of this contribution on the insurer's duty of transparency, Lubbe's concise view that 
the principle of good faith is "uncertain in content" can be supported. But, apart 
from requiring honesty in commercial dealings, he argues that "[i]t at least connotes 
that a party should show a minimum respect for the interests that the other party 
seeks to advance by means of the contract".84 Good faith is therefore not a validity 
requirement, or an essential or distinguising feature of an insurance contract. As 
confirmed by the Supreme Court of Appeal in Brisley v Drotsky:85 
                                        
82  Mutual & Federal Insurance Co v Oudsthoorn Municipality 1985 1 SA 419 (A) 433. 
83  It was already recognised in Roman law in D 16 3 31 that "[t]he good faith requirement calls for 
level dealing of the highest degree". 
84  Lubbe 1990 Stell LR 25. 
85  Brisley v Drotsky 2002 4 SA 1 (SCA) 15. 
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[G]ood faith may be regarded as an ethical value or controlling principle based on 
community standards of decency and fairness that underlies and informs the 
substantive law of contract, and not a 'free-floating' requirement for the conclusion 
of a valid contract or a basis for avoiding contractual liability.86 
The Supreme Court of Appeal in a recent judgment in the case of Everfresh Market 
Virginia (Pty) Ltd v Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd87 held that there is no binding duty 
to enter into bona fide negotiations with the purposes or expectation of the 
conclusion of a contract. In this case the parties agreed that they would negotiate in 
good faith to amend or renew their existing contractual obligation.88 In casu the 
appellant averred that the defendant did not enter into negotiations at all, breaching 
the agreement and its duty to negotiate in good faith. The court did not address the 
general duty of good faith, but rather the fact that our common law has to be 
developed and interpreted according to constitutional values and norms. It held that 
it was necessary to consider whether to develop the common law in accordance with 
the Consitution and whether the detailed provisions of the clause carry the 
necessary implication that the renewal was not to be regarded as null and void in 
every respect.89 
The proposition that a common law contract principle that provides meaningful 
parameters to render an agreement to negotiate in good faith enforceable is 
decidedly more consistent with section 39(2) than a regime that does not. A 
common-law principle that renders an obligation to negotiate in good faith 
enforceable cannot be said to be inconsistent with the sanctity of contract and the 
                                        
86  Brisley v Drotsky 2002 4 SA 1 (SCA)  para 22. 
87  Everfresh Market Virginia (Pty) Ltd v Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd 2012 1 SA 256 (SCA). 
88  The lease was for five years from 1 April 2004 to 31 March 2009. Clause 3 provided: "Provided 
that the Lessee has faithfully and timeously fulfilled and performed all its obligations under and 
in terms of this Lease, the Lessee shall have the right to renew same for a further period of four 
years and eleven months commencing on 1st April 2009, such renewal to be upon the same 
terms and conditions as in this Lease contained save that there shall be no further right of 
renewal, and save that the rentals for the renewal period shall be agreed upon between the 
Lessor and the Lessee at the time. The said right of renewal is subject to the Lessee giving 
written notice to the Lessor of its intention so to renew, which notice shall reach the Lessor not 
less than six (6) calendar months prior to the date of termination of this Lease. In the event of 
no such notice being received by the Lessor, or in the event of notice being duly received but the 
Parties failing to reach agreement in regard to the rentals for the renewal period at least three 
(3) calendar months prior to the date of termination of this Lease, then in either event this right 
of renewal shall be null and void." 
89  Everfresh Market Virginia (Pty) Ltd v Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd 2012 1 SA 256 (SCA) paras 18, 
36. 
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important moral denominator of good faith. Indeed, the enforceability of a principle 
of this kind accords with and is an important component of the process of the 
development of a new constitutional contractual order. There is no doubt that a 
requirement that allows a party to a contract to ignore the detailed provisions of a 
contract as though they had never been written is less consistent with these 
contractual precepts: precepts that are in harmony with the spirit, purport and 
objects of the Constitution.90  
Contracting parties certainly need to relate to each other in good faith. Where there 
is a contractual obligation to negotiate, it would be hardly imaginable that our 
constitutional values would not require that the negotiation must be done 
reasonably, with a view to reaching an agreement and in good faith.91 This position 
was due to other complications in the case itself not finally confirmed as a general 
rule of law that would necessarily apply to all contracts. The path has, however, 
been paved by this judgment to introduce such a duty on the basis of constitutional 
values where relevant.  
Although specific statutory provisions have been enacted to regulate disclosures in 
insurance contracts, the insurance legislation examined in this contribution is not all-
encompassing, necessitating the application of these general legal principles where 
statutory regulation is found to be lacking.92 
3.2 Precontractual information and bona fide negotiations in terms of 
insurance statutes  
3.2.1 FAIS Act 
Where common-law rules pertaining to precontractual negotiations are often more 
general,93 statutory rules pertaining to financial products are not only very detailed 
but also designed to force insurance companies to be transparent. Section 3 of the 
GCC in terms of the FAIS Act places specific duties on services providers when 
                                        
90  Everfresh Market Virginia (Pty) Ltd v Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd 2012 1 SA 256 (SCA) para 36. 
91  Everfresh Market Virginia (Pty) Ltd v Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd 2012 1 SA 256 (SCA) para 73. 
92  See also PEICL a 2:301 c12 n1, 105. 
93  Reinecke et al General Principles of Insurance Law 179, 376 
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rendering financial services and this applies to all insurance contracts. It states that 
when rendering these services (which would include the rendering of advice or 
intermediary services pertaining to a long-term insurance product) the provider must 
ensure that the representations made and information provided to a client by the 
provider must adhere to a number of requirements.94 
The information and representations must be factually correct95 and provided in 
plain language.96 It must also avoid uncertainty or confusion and must not be 
misleading.97 This reflects the general scope of transparency in that the information 
disclosed must be clear, understandable or intelligible, and unambiguous. 
Furthermore, it must be adequate and appropriate in the circumstances of the 
particular financial service, taking into account the factually established or 
reasonably assumed level of knowledge of the client,98 and it must be provided 
timeously so as to afford the client reasonably sufficient time to make an informed 
decision about the proposed transaction.99 Representations and information may, 
subject to the provisions of this Code, be provided orally and, at the client's request, 
confirmed in writing within a reasonable time after such a request.100 Where 
information and representations are provided in writing or by means of standard 
forms or format, it must be in a clear and readable print size, spacing and format.101 
Because the FAIS Act deals with financial products, the GCC further stipulates that 
information and representations regarding all amounts, sums, values, charges, fees, 
remuneration or monetary obligations mentioned or referred to therein and payable 
to the product supplier or the provider must be reflected in specific monetary 
terms.102 This stipulation further enhances transparency. Furthermore, where any 
                                        
94  See JJ Grove v National Insurance Co-ordinators CC unreported case number FOC 4564/06-
07/GP (3) of 2 November 2012. 
95  Section 3(1)(a)(i) of the FAIS Act. 
96  Section 3(1)(a)(ii) of the FAIS Act. 
97  Section 3(1)(a)(ii) of the FAIS Act. 
98  Section 3(1)(a((iii) of the FAIS Act. 
99  Section 3(1)(a)(iv) of the FAIS Act. 
100  Section 3(1)(a)(v) of the FAIS Act. 
101  Section 3(1)(a)(vi) of the FAIS Act. 
102  Section 3(1)(a)(vii) of the FAIS Act. 
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such amount, sum, value, charge, fee, remuneration or monetary obligation is not 
reasonably predeterminable, its basis of calculation must be adequately described.103 
Simply reading off the list makes one feel exhausted, and hence the question: Could 
the Regulator not simply have stipulated that intermediaries and advisors should at 
all times be transparent in their dealings with prospective insureds? In this vein one 
can understand the question raised internationally of whether a sui generis 
insurance law principle of a general duty of transparency has in fact developed over 
time.104 A perusal of Ombud determinations in South Africa, however, tends to refute 
this claim. 
One example of where the Regulator opted for detailed rules as opposed to more 
general ones is the GCC's stipulations on conflict of interests. A recent example of a 
conflict of interest is Registrar of Financial Services Providers v Fusion Properties 268 
CC t/a Broker's Choice, which was heard by the Enforcement Committee.105 The 
respondent in casu was Fusion Properties 268 CC t/a Broker's Choice, a close 
corporation and authorised financial services provider. The respondent was 
represented by Mr Botha, the sole member and key individual of the respondent. On 
24 August 2011 some fourteen clients of the respondent replaced their short-term 
policies on the respondent's advice. The replacement policies were administered by 
Counterpoint Trading 328 CC t/a Policy Provider, the latter also being an authorised 
financial services provider. The practice of moving clients' policies is not suspect in 
itself. In fact, if a broker realises that his clients are not receiving value for their 
money or that a particular insurer is factually insolvent, it is expected of that broker 
to advise his clients accordingly and make suggestions regarding alternative 
insurance. 
                                        
103  Amounts, sums, values, charges, fees, remuneration or monetary obligations mentioned need 
not be duplicated or repeated to the same client unless material or significant changes affecting 
that client occur, or the relevant financial service renders it necessary, in which case a disclosure 
of the changes to the client must be made without delay. 
104  A possibility also considered by the authors. Although this contribution does not also include a 
comparative study, this universal question has for example been critically discussed at the 
Transparency in Insurance Law Joint Seminar held on 4 May 2012 by the German and Turkish 
Chapters of AIDA (Istanbul); and is also considered in PEICL 94 to 96.   
105  Registrar of Financial Services Providers v Fusion Properties 268 CC t/a Broker's Choice 
(Enforcement Committee) unreported case number 22 of 10 July 2012. 
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There were however two issues with this particular move. The first transgression 
pertained to the respondent's failure to disclose to the clients the actual and 
potential financial implications, costs and consequences of the replacement policy 
and is not relevant to the present discussion. The second issue pertained to the 
respondent's failure to disclose to its clients that Mr Botha was the key individual of 
Counterpoint Trading 328 CC t/a Policy Provider and that he had an ownership 
interest as well as a financial interest in the replacement policies. The parties agreed 
that the respondent's failure to disclose these key facts regarding the replacement 
policies constituted a contravention of sections 8(1)(d)(i) and 8(1)(d)(ii) of the GCC.  
Board Notice 58 of 10 April 2010 (which had already been introduced before the 
Fusion Properties case) introduced a statutory definition for conflict of interest as 
opposed to a common law definition and, in addition, terms such as "financial 
interest", "ownership interest", "immaterial financial interest" and "'third party" were 
clearly defined.106 Cases such as Fusion Properties illustrate that common-law 
definitions are not always sufficient and that more detailed rules are needed in order 
to enhance transparency.107  
The GCC now stipulates that the provider must disclose to the client the existence of 
any personal interest in the relevant service, or of any circumstance which gives rise 
to an actual or potential conflict of interest in relation to such a service, and take all 
reasonable steps to ensure the fair treatment of the client.108 Non-cash incentives 
offered and/or other indirect considerations payable by another provider, a product 
supplier or any other person to the provider could be viewed as a potential conflict 
of interest.109 Furthermore, the service must be rendered in accordance with the 
                                        
106  Moolman et al Financial Advisory and Intermediary Services Guide 168. 
107  "Conflict of interest" is defined in the GCC, as are terms such as "financial interest", "ownership 
interest", "immaterial financial interest" and "third party". Accordingly, "conflict of interest" 
denotes: "any situation in which a provider or a representative has an actual or potential interest 
that may, in rendering a financial service to a client, -(a) influence the objective performance of 
his, her or its obligations to that client, or (b) prevent a provider or representative from 
rendering an unbiased and fair financial service to that client, or from acting in the interests of 
that client, including, but not limited to- (i) a financial interest; (ii) an ownership interest; and 
(iii) any relationship with a third party". Own emphasis. 
108  Section 1(1) of the GCC, sv "Conflict of Interest". Also see s 3(f) of the GCC. 
109  Registrar of Financial Services Providers v Fusion Properties 268 CC t/a Broker's Choice 
(Enforcement Committee) unreported case number 22 of 10 July 2012. 
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contractual relationship and reasonable requests or instructions of the client, which 
must be executed as soon as reasonably possible and with due regard to the 
interests of the client. These must be accorded appropriate priority over any 
interests of the provider.110  
Also, the transactions of a client must be accurately accounted for and the provider 
involved must not deal in any financial product for his own benefit, account or 
interest where the dealing is based upon advanced knowledge of pending 
transactions for or with clients. This also applies to any non-public information the 
disclosure of which would be expected to affect the prices of such a product.111 
In addition to all the above-mentioned precontractual obligations, the GCC further 
stipulates that a provider must disclose to a client information on the relevant 
product suppliers, providers and most importantly, information about the financial 
service.112 In the case of life insurance, a reasonable and appropriate general 
explanation of the nature and material terms of the contract must be provided. The 
intermediary must, for example, explain to a client whether a contract constitutes 
whole-life insurance or endowment insurance.113 Transparency is further enhanced 
by placing an obligation on the intermediary to make full and frank disclosure of any 
information that would reasonably be expected to enable the client to make an 
informed decision, and also to disclose material contractual information. For 
instance, if a life policy excludes claims where the life insured died as a result of 
suicide, this fact should be disclosed.  
For life insurance it is also obligatory to provide full and appropriate information of 
the name, class or type of policy, the nature and extent of the benefits to be 
provided, and the manner in which the benefits will be paid. Information on the 
                                        
110  Section 3(d) of the GCC. 
111  Section 3(e) of the GCC. 
112  Section 7 of the GCC. 
113  According to Nienaber and Reinecke Life Insurance 74-75, whole life insurance is a basic life 
insurance policy. Against a premium, the policy guarantees to pay the sum insured. Endowment 
insurance is different because such a policy has a term and a maturity date. The policyholder or 
beneficiary receives a benefit either whether he dies before the maturity date or whether he is 
alive on the maturity date. 
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nature and extent of the client's monetary obligations, which in the case of long-
term insurance is the payment of the premium, must also be disclosed in full.114 
In explaining the client's monetary obligations, an intermediary must also explain 
how payment should be made and how often,115 and very importantly, what the 
consequences will be in the case of non-payment. An aspect which is important for 
long-term insurance policies is any anticipated or contractual escalations, increases 
or additions to the product, such as premium increases due to inflation. 
Furthermore, a client must be informed of the nature, extent and frequency of any 
incentive, remuneration, consideration, commission, fee or brokerages (any 
"valuable consideration"),116 which will or may become payable to the provider, by 
any product supplier or any person other than the client, or for which the provider 
may become eligible. Payments made must be as a result of the rendering of the 
financial service, as well as the identity of the product supplier or other person 
providing or offering the valuable consideration.117 
As far as the proposed contract between the parties is concerned, the intermediary 
has an obligation to disclose to the client concise details of any special terms or 
conditions, exclusions of liability, waiting periods, loadings, penalties, excesses, 
restrictions or circumstances in which benefits will not be provided and any 
guaranteed minimum benefits or other guarantees. Further disclosures must be 
made regarding the extent to which the product is readily realisable or to which the 
funds concerned are accessible.118 The GCC also provides for disclosures regarding 
material tax considerations, whether cooling-off rights are offered and, if so, the 
procedures for the exercise of such rights. It is important to disclose any material 
investment or other risks associated with the product and, where provision is made 
                                        
114  Section 7 of the GCC. 
115  Section 7 of the GCC. 
116  Meaning any value changing hands, not to be confused with the English doctrine of valuable 
consideration in the context as a requirement for the valid conclusion of a contract, which does 
not apply in our law.  
117  Provided that where the maximum amount or rate of such a valuable consideration is prescribed 
by any law, the provider may (subject to s 3(1)(a)(vii)) elect to disclose either the actual amount 
applicable or such a prescribed maximum amount or rate. 
118  In addition, there should be disclosures regarding any restrictions on or penalties for early 
termination of the contract or withdrawal from the product, or other effects, if any, of such a 
termination or withdrawal (s 7(1)(c)(ix) of the GCC). 
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for an increase of premiums, the amount of the increased premium for the first five 
years and thereafter on a five year basis but not exceeding twenty years.119 
An intermediary must fully inform a client in regard to the completion or submission 
of any transaction requirement – such as an application form – that all material facts 
must be accurately and properly disclosed, and that the accuracy and completeness 
of all answers, statements or other information provided by or on behalf of the client 
are the client's own responsibility.120 Where the provider completes or submits any 
transaction requirement on behalf of the client, the client should be satisfied as to 
the accuracy and completeness of the details.121 Furthermore, a client should be 
informed of the possible consequences of the misrepresentation or non-disclosure of 
a material fact or the inclusion of incorrect information.122 It is also imperative to 
inform a client that he has the right to be supplied with a copy or written or printed 
record of any transaction requirement within a reasonable time, should he request 
this.123 No provider may in the course of the rendering of a financial service request 
any client to sign any written or printed form or document unless all details required 
to be inserted thereon by the client or on behalf of the client have already been 
inserted. Having a client sign only a blank application form clearly goes against the 
notion of transparency. It can once more be emphasised that these rules apply to all 
types of insurance contracts.  
3.2.2 LTIA and STIA 
Although PPRs seemingly have bearing upon existing contracts and should not form 
part of the discussion on precontractual negotiations, the conduct of intermediaries 
is often the direct cause of the inclusion of a clause in a contract that is unfair to the 
client and ultimately results in some direct or indirect advantage to the intermediary 
and/or the insurer. There is probably an overlap between some of the GCC's 
stipulations and the PPRs on precontractual negotiations. Although this may lead to 
                                        
119  Section 7 of the GCC. 
120  Section 7 of the GCC. 
121  Section 7 of the GCC. 
122  Section 7 of the GCC. 
123  Section 7 of the GCC. In keeping with the consumer maxim verba volant, scripta manent, which 
roughly translates as "spoken words fly away, yet written words remain". 
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problems of interpretation and is less than ideal, it actually has the effect of 
enhancing consumers' rights. 
For long-term insurance, it deserves mentioning that Part IX Rule 19.1 of the PPR 
voids any waiver or conduct to induce a waiver of any right or benefit conferred 
upon a policyholder. In addition, Part IX Rule 20 provides for the payment of 
penalties where an insurer contravenes or fails to comply with any of the PPRs, with 
the result that insurers who are in breach of this rule face penalties regardless of 
whether such waiver actually had detrimental consequences or not. 
In a similar way, Part VI Rule 8 of the PPRs in terms of the STIA voids any waiver or 
conduct to induce a waiver of any right or benefit conferred upon the policyholder by 
these Rules. Transparency requirements are further enhanced by Rule 4.2(c), which 
requires disclosure records and documentation to be kept for at least five years after 
the termination of the relevant policy. Rule 5 provides details of the provisions that 
will be void upon inclusion in the contract, and Rule 6 prescibes the format of the 
policy document.124 Finally, Rule 9 provides for the payment of penalties where an 
insurer contravenes or fails to comply with any of the PPR. 
4 Consequences, sanctions and penalties for failure to comply with 
transparency, good faith and fairness duties 
4.1 General 
In the light of the above, it is necessary to consider the consequences of infringing 
the common law and statutory duties pertaining to precontractual information 
obligations. Because various consequences attach to infringements, it is best to 
categorise infringements in accordance with these consequences. For the purposes 
                                        
124  This rule deals with issuing the policy document and not with the conclusion of the insurance 
contract. It may be issued only if the provisions are recorded, as regards layout, letter types and 
spacing, in an easily readable manner and if the wording of every provision of the policy has a 
reasonably precise, ascertainable meaning. In addition, the insurer must, within a reasonable 
period, inform a policyholder in writing of the details of any available internal complaint 
resolution system and procedures, as well as full particulars relating to the Short-term Insurance 
Ombudsman. Rule 7.5 specifically requires an insurer to ensure that a policy contains a provision 
for a period of grace for the payment of premiums of not less than 15 days after the relevant 
due date for payment, provided that if it is a monthly policy, such a provision must apply with 
effect from the second month of the currency of the policy. 
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of this discussion a distinction is made between consequences that affect the 
obligations between the parties and can roughly be categorised as contractual 
matters, and consequences that invoke penalties and other enforcement actions. 
4.2 Consequences that affect the obligations between the parties and 
dispute resolution by the FAIS Ombud 
4.2.1 Under general common law 
Failure to comply with this common law duty leads to a misrepresentation, which 
renders the contract not ipso facto void, but merely voidable at the election of the 
prejudiced party.125 The insurance proposer has a right to avoid liability on the 
contract just as the insurer has the right to do so where a proposer misrepresents a 
material fact. Should the contract be voided at the election of the innocent party, an 
ex lege duty to give restitution exists.126 Where the contract is divisible, it may be 
partially voided and the non-offending portion of the contract maintained.  
Where the misrepresentation causes a iustus error in the mind of the prospective 
policyholder, the aggrieved party can in the alternative rely on the total absence of 
consensus. A contract will be deemed to be void ab initio only where the error is 
both material and reasonable. The court pointed out in Brink v Humphries & Jewell 
(Pty) Ltd127 that "[w]here the misrepresentation results in a fundamental mistake, 
the 'contract' is void ab initio".128 In this scenario there is no ex lege duty to give 
restitution and claim the return of performances already delivered. An error will be 
deemed to be reasonable when it is caused by the other party's misrepresentation. 
It should be noted that errors in motive are not seen as material or relevant, and the 
prospective policyholder cannot rely on a mistake of this nature.  
Yet where an insurer fails to disclose material and relevant information pertaining to 
the insurance product, which creates an error in motive that induces the prospective 
                                        
125  Allen v Sixteen Stirling Investments (Pty) Ltd 1974 4 SA 164 (D) 169; Feinstein v Nigli 1981 2 SA 
684 (A) 700. 
126  Extel Industrial(Pty) Ltd v Crown Mills (Pty) Ltd 1999 2 SA 719 (A); 733 on the possibility of a 
claim for damages.  
127  Brink v Humphries & Jewell (Pty) Ltd 2005 2 SA 419 (SCA). 
128  Brink v Humphries & Jewell (Pty) Ltd 2005 2 SA 419 (SCA) 421. 
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policyholder to conclude the insurance contract, that qualifies as an actionable 
misrepresentation. Provisions that are agreed to yet not transparent due to errors or 
misrepresentations can in this manner be held to be non-binding.129 Where the 
policyholder would choose to maintain the policy yet insists that an ambiguous or 
unclear provision be interpreted to his benefit, the contra preferentem-rule would 
offer some relief.  
4.2.2 Under statutory law 
A transgression of section 14 of the GCC falls within the FSB's Enforcement 
Committee's jurisdiction.130 Furthermore, a client who had acts to his own detriment 
because of advertising that was misleading and fell short of the minimum standards 
as set out by section 14 of the GCC has recourse against the advertiser. This means 
that the matter may be referred to the FAIS Ombud or to a court. 
Where an intermediary, representative or employee of an insurance company 
breaches any of his duties to a client, the client (the policyholder) has a right to take 
recourse in accordance with the provisions of the FAIS Act. It depends on the facts 
in each case whether the intermediary will be liable or whether liability attaches to 
the intermediary and the insurer.131 For instance, where the intermediary or advisor 
was in fact an employee or a representative of the insurer in terms of an 
employment or other contract, the insurer is liable as well, because the employee or 
representatives rendered services under the insurer's supervision.132 
A complainant can complain to the FAIS Ombud. A complaint can be about a 
contravention of the FAIS Act or a failure to comply with a provision of the Act which 
has led to the complainant's suffering financial prejudice or damage or, where he 
                                        
129  It is usually the case in consumer contracts where clauses must be fair to the consumer, that a 
non-transparent provision is held to be unfair and therefore non-binding. 
130  Also see para 4.4 below. 
131  See Moolman et al Financial Advisoy and Intermediary Services Guide 61, 73-79. The insurer will 
be a defendant in such an action where the insurer was the employer of the advisor or 
intermediary in accordance with the principles of vicarious liability. On vicarious liability, see 
Neethling and Potgieter Law of Delict 372. 
132  See Judith Augusta Theophiel Eduard Campioni-De Vleesshauwer v Suzette Brickhill and Mathys 
Johannes Marais t/a Protea Makelaars unreported case number FAIS 04437/11-12/LP 3 of 21 
January 2014. 
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has not already suffered financial prejudice or damage, is likely to do so in future.133 
For the purposes of a case before the Ombud, it is not necessary to prove that there 
has already been a loss, but even a future loss can found a case. However, if a 
policyholder wants to approach a court, it is necessary to prove that a contravention 
of the FAIS Act has already caused financial prejudice. Another cause of complaint to 
the Ombud is the wilful or negligent rendering of a financial service to the 
complainant, which has caused prejudice or damage to the complainant or which will 
cause prejudice or damage in future. Again, in order to found a civil action, the wilful 
or negligent rendering of a financial service does provide a disgruntled policyholder 
an action in a civil court, but the Ombud can also hear cases where a complainant is 
expected to suffer prospective damage. Finally, the Ombud can hear cases where 
the complainant has been treated unfairly.134 
There are great similarities between the powers of a civil court and that of the office 
of the Ombud. For instance, a determination by the Ombud has the same effect as a 
court order. However the monetary jurisdictional limit on Ombud cases is  
R800 000.135 
Because the FAIS Act must be construed as being in addition to any other law not 
inconsistent with its provisions, the Ombud should also consider common-law 
aspects pertaining to contract, such as the validity of contracts or individual 
provisions in contracts, as set out above.136 
In the light of the above, the question is really whether and under which 
circumstances infringement will affect a contract or individual contractual provisions 
to such an extent that the particular contract or individual provisions will be invalid. 
As already stated, this will be determined on a case-by-case basis in the first 
instance according to the relevant statutory criteria and, where necessary, in 
conjunction with and as informed by the provisions of substantive common law. 
                                        
133  Section 1(1)(a) of the FAIS Act, sv "complaint". "Financial prejudice" or "damage" all have very 
specific meanings in law. See para 4.3 below for a discussion on this matter. 
134  Reinecke et al General Principles of Insurance Law 354. 
135  See the discussion of such a monetary claim in para 4.3. 
136  Section 1(6) of the FAIS Act. 
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4.3 Payment of damages or other compensation 
Where an infringement of the rules pertaining to bona fide negotiations has not 
resulted in an invalid contract or invalid contractual provisions but it has caused the 
policyholder harm, one may ask whether and under which circumstances 
infringement may result in damages or other compensation being awarded to the 
insured or a party such as a beneficiary. 
Where the misrepresentation is intentional or negligent, the presence of fault 
enables the prospective policyholder to claim delictual damages, provided the other 
requirements for a delictual damages claim are also met.137 Acknowledging a 
contractual damages claim for a precontractual misrepresentation will not be 
possible, as it would elevate the duty of representation to a contractual provision.138 
The courts furthermore have an inherent jurisdiction to award a damages claim 
based on a failure to adhere to statutory administrative procedures and in extreme 
cases even constitutional damages where an infringement of a constitutional right 
(in this case the right of access to information) causes compensable damages.139 
For insurance claims, the FAIS Ombud has extensive discretionary powers to award 
an amount as fair compensation for any "financial prejudice" or "damage" 
suffered.140 As stated above, this is limited to a maximum amount of R800 000.141 
The Ombud may also prescribe interest at a rate within his discretion, as discussed 
above. It is submitted that such a claim for damages in terms of the FAIS Act by far 
outweighs the onerous process of claiming damages in a court of law. This appears 
to be the most suitable remedy for the disgruntled policyholder where the insurer's 
conduct lacks transparency. 
                                        
137  Conduct (either a commission or an omission of an ex lege duty to disclose); wrongfulness; fault; 
causation (both physical and legal) and loss or damages.  
138  As pointed out by the court in Trotman v Edwick 1951 1 SA 443 (A) 449. 
139  This will clearly depend on whether or not such an award is seen as "appropriate relief" in 
accordance with s 38 of the Constitution, which poses its own unique challenges which include 
approaching the court at great expense. In this regard also see Fose v Minister of Safety and 
Security 1997 3 SA 786 (CC). 
140  Section 20 of the FAIS Act. 
141  In this regard see Moolman et al Financial Advisory and Intermediary Services Guide 233. 
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The complainant, applicant or plaintiff bears the general burden of proof. It must be 
proven on a balance of probabilities that damage or loss was suffered and a 
reasonable estimate provided to the Ombud or court of law or other determination 
tribunal or body. An award will be in the discretion of the Ombud or the presiding 
officer. 
4.4 Consequences that invoke statutory enforcement action  
4.4.1 Enforcement Committee actions in terms of the FAIS Act 
The FSB acts against insurance intermediaries via the Enforcement Committee. The 
Enforcement Committee is an administrative body which adjudicates all alleged 
contraventions of legislation administered by the FSB.142 The Committee may impose 
unlimited penalties, compensation orders and cost orders. Such orders are 
enforceable as if they were judgments of the High Court of South Africa.143 The 
Enforcement Committee may rule against a contravention of any legislation 
administered by the FSB and in the context of insurance this means a contravention 
of the LTIA Act, the STIA and the FAIS Act, although the bulk of rules fall within the 
ambit of the FAIS Act. The ruling is made against the perpetrator and the facts of 
the matter will determine whether only the intermediary or the intermediary and the 
insurer will be liable to pay the penalty. 
In addition to the payment of penalties, the FSB may pursue a variety of other 
enforcement actions.144 Section 14(a) provides for the debarment of persons who no 
longer meet the personal characteristics or qualities of honesty and integrity or 
where such a person contravenes any provisions of the FAIS Act. For instance, if a 
broker is found guilty of fraud in a criminal court he no longer meets the Fit and 
Proper Requirements.145 
                                        
142  This Committee functions in accordance with s 10 of the Financial Services Board Act 97 of 1990. 
143   FSB 2015 https://www.fsb.co.za/enforcementCommittee/Pages/enforcementActions.aspx. 
144  Hatting and Millard FAIS Act Explained 181-198. 
145  Moolman et al Financial Advisory and Intermediary Services Guide 28-31. 
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The Registrar is entitled to suspend or withdraw any licence of FSP.146 This will also 
be a remedy where any FSP no longer meets the financial and procedural 
requirements for it to operate as an FSP.147 The FAIS Act also provides for voluntary 
sequestration, winding-up and closure of an FSP, which provides indirect protection 
to clients and prospective policyholders.148 The removal of directors facilitates the 
enforcement of the FAIS Act.149  
Appeals regarding any administrative action taken by the Registrar may be made to 
the FSB Appeal Board.150 The High Court has inherent jurisdiction to review any 
administrative action, including action taken by the Registrar.  
4.4.2 Actions in terms of the LTIA and STIA 
The LTIA provides for the registration of long-term insurers, for the control of certain 
activities of long-term insurers and intermediaries, and for matters connected 
therewith. As the Act is of a regulatory nature, it prescribes rules for the registration 
of insurers, business and administrative practices and policies of insurers and 
intermediaries, financial arrangements, judicial management and the final winding-
up of insurers. The Act also creates punishable offences and prescribes penalties for 
non-compliance. It does not contain specific rules on transparency issues. The STIA 
provides for the registration of short-term insurers; the control of certain activities of 
short-term insurers and intermediaries; and for matters connected therewith such as 
short-term insurance business, which include business and administrative practices 
and policies, financial arrangements, judicial management and the winding-up of 
insurers, prescribes specific fee structures and allows for an order to pay penalties 
for non-compliance. Therefore, unless an insurer is prohibited from carrying on 
business or is debarred or placed in liquidation or under sequestration, there is 
nothing that prevents such an insurer or his representatives from entering into 
contracts. 
                                        
146  Section 9 of the FAIS Act. 
147  Section 8 of the FAIS Act. Also see Hatting and Millard FAIS Act Explained 181 for a general 
discussion on suspensions and the withdrawals of licences. 
148  Section 38 of the FAIS Act. 
149  Section 8(1) of the FAIS Act. 
150  Section 26 of the FAIS Act. Also see Hatting and Millard FAIS Act Explained 195 for a discussion 
on the appeals procedure. 
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Although these consequences can be seen either as the carrot or the stick, they do 
not enable the policyholders any right of financial redress due to the resulting lack of 
transparency. Courts have an inherent jurisdiction to adjudicate and determine 
issues of a failure to comply with the LTIA and the STIA, as set out above, yet the 
statutes do not allow the courts to award any financial compensation to 
policyholders who suffer losses due to the insurer's failure to comply with its duties 
in terms of the acts.151 
5 Conclusion 
It remains an international question whether a sui generis insurance law principle of 
a general duty of transparency has in fact developed over time. It is ubiquitous as it 
features throughout the insurance sector and the product life cycle – in the 
precontracting process as discussed in this contribution, the rights and duties of the 
contracting parties (which include product and cost transparency), dispute resolution 
and insurance supervisory law.152 
Transparency as a value is firmly embedded not only in common-law rules pertaining 
to precontractual negotiations that have bearing on insurance contracts, but also in 
the detailed rules that govern the behaviour of insurers, intermediaries and advisors. 
This is a matter that most modern-day insurance lawyers struggle with, as common 
law and statutory principles cannot be disengaged into two autonomous sets of 
rules. In a nutshell, irrespective of the source of the rules, transparency is brought 
about when all of the relevant information is completely, clearly and with certainty 
disclosed in an intelligible manner. Not only does this promote trust in our financial 
services industry but it also promotes a feeling of security for consumers. 
 The drive to professionalise the financial services industry and to develop the skills 
and knowledge of those who sell insurance products not only saw the promulgation 
of the FAIS Act but also amendments to the PPRs. The message is clear: the 
insurance industry cannot afford to do business in a way that is not consumer-
                                        
151  The same applies where there is a contravention of the Promotion of Access to Information Act 2 
of 2000. 
152  As concluded by Wandt "Transparency as a General Principle" 9. 
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orientated and transparent. Mistakes cost money. Institutions such as the FAIS 
Ombud make it possible for aggrieved clients to enforce their rights and over and 
above civil judgments against services providers, the payment of exhorbitant 
penalties represent the stick, in case the carrot (the promise of satisfied, well-
informed clients) was not juicy enough. 
The South African legislative framework for financial services providers, although 
complicated and very detailed, complements common-law rules, and together these 
rules form a sound platform which should inspire consumer confidence.  
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